![]() |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
KAZAKHSTAN |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Having suffered three major crises - the break up of the CIS, the 1998 Russia Crisis, and the depressed oil prices of the same time - the Kazakh economy is now reaping the benefits of the liberalizing economic reform measures taken Although oil prices remain depressed in real terms, Kazakhstan is enjoying positive results from massive increases in production. Exports doubled from 1999 to 2000, in part owing to improved access to international markets. The benefits of oil are felt also through massive FDI, to build capacity, and also through taxes on companies and individuals employed in providing infrastructure and services The public finances of Kazakhstan are in excellent condition at present, buoyed by vastly increased tax revenues and tightly controlled expenditure. The government ran a fiscal surplus of 12.9% of GDP in the first quarter of 2001. The morass of subsovereign indebtedness is being addressed through an interventionist scheme of fiscal transfers and limits on borrowings at the Oblast level The external position of Kazakhstan is extremely robust. There is a huge balance of payments surplus, overseas borrowing is limited and for extended maturities. Domestic holdings of hard currencies are substantial, bolstered by multibillion dollar holdings in the pension funds and the petroleum fund, both increasing in size at a rapid pace. The obverse of the oil success story is that Kazakhstan runs the risk of “Dutch Disease” whereby export revenues from commodities cause appreciation of the real exchange rate and render other sectors uncompetitive. The indirect income from employment in oil and other sectors combined with increased government largesse in social spending may combine to fuel inflation. So far the government has avoided this, in part through the petroleum fund, but poor social indicators and increased democratisation may create increased pressure for more spending.
Kazakhstan, one of the larger constituent parts of the former USSR, was one of the last of the 15 Soviet republics to declare independence in 1991. Kazakhstan entered independence challenged by a number of adverse factors: the extremely delicate ethnic balance (Kazakhs were only 44 % of population in 1989[1]); a strong dependence of the economy upon other parts of the former Soviet Union; not having its own armed forces at a time when bitter ethnic conflicts were already flaring up throughout the region, and a geopolitical position land-locked between Russia and China. The subsequent ten years of independent Kazakhstan betray a history of a nation’s struggle, led by a shrewd and patriotic political elite, to preserve and develop a nation state. The political leadership faced formidable challenges: to preserve national sovereignty and territorial integrity, without antagonising powerful neighbours; to escape domination by one power by manoeuvring between Russia, China and the US; to reform the collapsing planned economy and introduce market forces; and to develop new transport routes for commodity exports. Kazakhstan’s political establishment is built around one charismatic figure – that of the President Nursultan Nazarbaev, former Prime-Minister of Kazakhstan within the USSR. The existing political system is described as dirigiste and technocratic. Although some question the level of democracy relative to western standards, international organizations, such as the OSCE[2], highly praise Kazakhstan for its ethnic stability and constructive relations with neighbouring countries. International economic and financial bodies, such as the World Bank/IMF, EBRD, and the OECD often award Kazakhstan the status of economic reform leader in the CIS. The mass media of Almaty and Astana are free to criticize the Government, whereas those in the oblasts (provinces) are more restrained. Kazakhstan is well endowed with mineral wealth – its reserves of oil, gas, coal, ferrous and non-ferrous metals are of world significance. Development of these resources is the mainstay of the local economy and will determine the nation’s economic prospects in the foreseeable future. Especially significant is the oil and gas sector, which has attracted foreign direct investment (FDI) in such amounts as to make Kazakhstan one of the leaders in the whole post-communist region in terms of FDI per capita.
While the economy remains highly dependent upon the mining sector (with oil production representing around 12% of GDP and metallurgy a further 8%), in the absence of any sharp fall in oil prices, the potential risks to the fiscal stability of Kazakhstan are limited. The current international oil price of approximately $20 per barrel is understood to be consistent with government (and IMF) planning. Net indebtedness of the federal government is limited and declining with the government operating a surplus equal to 12.9% of GDP in the first quarter of 2001. The situation since then has become more complex, as since May 2001 surplus oil revenues are directed to the National Fund. However, the broad picture remains extremely positive. Furthermore, as the public debt is limited and maturities are long, there is minimal refinancing risk. As of the first quarter of 2000, two thirds of public sector foreign debt was owed to multilateral and bilateral, creditors with an average life for foreign debt of 9.8 years. The dependence on oil revenues for a positive fiscal balance is accentuated by weaknesses in tax administration. At the end of 1998, tax arrears amounted to 6.8% of GDP and have not been materially reduced since. Low rates of tax collection are reflected in the fact that the average effective tax rate on personal income is over 10% while the tax yield is only 2% of GDP. Similarly the 26% payroll tax produces revenues of only 4% of GDP and the 20% VAT generates less than 5% of GDP[3]. These numbers indicate a large degree of tax evasion.
Table 1. GDP Growth
For the first half of 2001, real GDP growth reached 14.1% versus the same period in 2000. This was one of the highest growth rates seen anywhere in the world. The economy of Kazakhstan is strongly affected by external conditions (especially those on the international oil and metals markets). The country exports some 43% of its GDP and a significant part of total investment is of foreign origin. This makes economic forecasting a big challenge for the Government, which tends to be conservative in its predictions. Tellingly, the GDP forecast for the whole of 2001 was only 4% growth, while the outcome is likely to exceed 12%. The Ministry of Economy and Trade envisions 7% GDP growth and 10% growth in industrial production for 2002.
Oil companies operating in Kazakhstan took advantage of the increase in oil prices on the world market to significantly increase exports of crude. In 2000, prices for fuel and energy resources in Kazakhstan grew 79% overall (against a fall of 9.4% in 1999), and oil producer prices grew 2.7 times. So much oil was exported that local refineries were starved of supplies (owing to higher overseas prices). This disparity between domestic and international prices for oil remains marked, but has declined modestly. For the period January to July 2001 the international oil price averaged $20.87 per barrel against $22.07 for the same period in 2000. Over the same time period the prices on the domestic market actually increased to give an average of $9.27 in 2001 against $6.40 in 2000. On August 8, 2001, the strategy for gas industry development to 2015 was elaborated by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. Today's resources of natural gas in the country are estimated at over 2trn m³. Extraction of natural gas in 2005 may reach 34bn m³ (consumption – 7.84bn), in 2010 – 47bn m³ (consumption 11.15bn) and in 2015 – 52bn m³ (consumption 15.83bn).
In the face of a drastically deteriorated (i.e. increased) terms of trade vis-à-vis the Russian manufacturing sector, and depleted foreign reserves, the Government and the National Bank agreed to adopt free currency flotation and a devaluation of the national currency at the beginning of 1999. The current account remained negative throughout 1999, however, and required further financing out of the foreign exchange reserves of the National Bank. Table 2. Balance of Payments
Unfortunately, the Capital Account also experienced a marked deterioration at the same time. This was mainly caused by a general and drastic reassessment of risk by investors in emerging markets, following the Asian and Russian crises. Investors’ confidence in Kazakhstan was further shaken by the adoption of a freely floating exchange rate. Foreign reserves started growing only from the very end of 1999 following strong growth in export and foreign investment. This trend has continued from that time (Table 3). Table 3. International Reserves*
As of 15 October 2001, the international reserves of the National Bank have reached $2.45bn, total international reserves have reached $3.63bn, including $1.18bn in the National Fund. As oil exports stand to grow significantly in coming years, the terms of trade are once again under threat from a real appreciation in the Tenge. There is a fundamental mismatch between exports of commodities, the prices of which are determined in volatile international markets[4], and imports which are largely for consumer, investment and intermediate products which typically reflect greater price stability. Exports of non-oil products have actually decreased in nominal terms since 1998. In the year 1999-2000 the terms of trade for Kazakhstan appreciated by over 30%[5]. Even excluding oil, there was an effective appreciation of 6.3%. A major challenge for Kazakhstan will be the prospect of “Dutch Disease” whereby buoyant exports of commodity goods cause a currency appreciation and render the non-oil economy uncompetitive. At present, a significant part of this problem is caused not only by the exports of oil products, but also the significant FDI to develop the oil industry and the commensurate indirect impact on the labour market. The sterilization of oil revenues into the National Fund goes some way to ameliorate this problem but implies that these revenues are not then available for much needed spending on social services and poverty alleviation. Foreign
and Domestic Debt
Furthermore, domestic debt is quickly decreasing, as the Government has no need to finance the budget through domestic borrowing. Consequently, the yields on Kazakh T-bills are very low at present.
Table 4. Foreign and Domestic Debt
Table 5. Exchange Rate
The Government assumed an exchange rate of 153.9 per $1, and an annual average – 149.9 per $1 when making budget projections for 2002.
Monetary
Policy and Inflation The strict monetary policy which was implemented until April 1999 ensured a decrease in inflation to 7.1% for the whole of 1998. However, the decrease in the rate of inflation was accompanied by an abrupt decline in money in circulation. This fall in liquidity served to further aggravate the internal crisis of commercial non-payment, as the National Bank’s policy of maintaining high interest rates kept money expensive and impeded credit to the real sector. The appreciating real exchange rate and the lack of domestic liquidity caused the Government of Kazakhstan and the National Bank to depart from strict monetary policy and adopt a more stimulative monetary and credit policy while allowing the exchange rate to float. Consequently, annual inflation increased in 1999 to 18%. Inflation was back in single digits by the end of 2000. Producer prices duly followed developments in the international oil and metals markets. A sharp increase started in late 1999, and continued until mid-2000. Throughout 2000, with the benefit of an improving economy and favourable inflation and exchange rate outlook, the National Bank continued to ease monetary policy, continuing this policy into 2001. Rapid expansion of the monetary base and especially broad money resulted from, and contributed to, fast economic growth. The process has not been accompanied by an upsurge in inflation. Table 6.Money aggregates
On September 6, 2001, the National Bank reduced the rate of refinancing from 12% down to 11%, making the third reduction in 2001, prompted mainly by continuing favourable inflation dynamics. The National Bank expects this reduction to cause not only lower interest rates, but also higher business confidence. Expectations are that the easing trend will continue for the medium term without enhancing inflationary pressure. By year-end 2001, inflation is forecast to be less than 7% per annum. In the 12 months to August 2002, inflation, as measured by the CPI has been 8.4%. The CPI also reflected zero inflation for the month of July. For 2002, inflation is expected to be in the range of 5-7 % and in the following 2-3 years it is expected to be within 4-6%. Currently the National Bank is contemplating the introduction of a new model for inflation deterrence. It envisions that the National Bank together with the Government will state a maximum reasonable level of inflation for a year (or a longer period) and will keep inflation within the stated limit.
Table 7.Inflation
Table 8. Credit ratings history of Kazakhstan
Moody's Investors Service announced a credit upgrade for Kazakhstan on 20 June 2001. Thus, the republic's bonds in foreign currency shifted from B1 to Ba2, and bank deposits in foreign currencies moved up to Ba3 from the previous rating of B1. Long-term state securities issued in national currency were also upgraded – from B1 up to Ba1. The forecast for all ratings is positive. According to the agency, the development of hydrocarbon fields and also the start of construction of oil and gas pipelines are confirmation that, in the medium-term, Kazakhstan will be able to achieve significant economic growth. The creation of the National Fund, according to Moody’s, will reduce the influence of world prices on the country's economy and the dependence of the state budget on such prices. They also noted an improvement in the general state of the banking system. After the Russian Crisis of 1998, Kazakhstan was the first CIS country able to issue a Eurobond (1999, $ 300mn), which was sold in the European and US capital markets.
Foreign
Direct Investment Aggregate FDI in Kazakhstan's economy from 1993 to 2000 has exceeded $12bn. After some decline in FDI in 1999 ($1.5bn), it has started growing again from 2000 ($2.7bn). The stock of FDI is heavily concentrated in the oil and gas sectors (56%) and the non-ferrous metallurgy (22%) sector.
Foreign
Trade Table 9. Exports and Imports
Table 10. Structure of Exports
Table 11. Structure of Imports
In contrast, after the last budget revision, expenditures are up only by KZT 19.6bn. Additionally, KZT 12.8bn will be contributed as charter capital for the newly created Development Bank of Kazakhstan. In the first quarter of 2001, the budget surplus reached the extraordinary level of 12.9% of GDP. Although an amendment to the budget duly followed, expenditures increased again and the share of Government revenue and expenditure in GDP shot up. Increasing the possibility for strong fiscal expansion without jeopardising the state budget, the Government has cut VAT from 20% to 16%, and social taxes from 26% to 21% (from 1 July 2001). Table 12. National Budget
Banking
Sector
The new law established the general functions of the National Bank of Kazakhstan, including managing monetary policy and credit regulation, and control of the list of operations permitted for Gosbank and the commercial banks. A regulatory environment was established for the first time for commercial banking. Formally, a two-tier banking sector was established, with the National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK, initially GosBank of Kazakhstan) representing the first tier, and the commercial banks comprising the second. Soon after independence, about 200 commercial banks were operating. Most were undercapitalised, as was the whole system, functioning in a weakly regulated, fraud-infested environment. In the decade to follow, the NBK made spectacular advances in terms of strengthening regulation and supervision, reducing the number of banks to 47 in 2001. Strict requirements to meet NBK-established international standards and higher capitalization were gradually applied to commercial banks. The national currency – the Tenge – was introduced at the height of the transition crisis – in November 1993. The accompanying additional extended responsibilities for monetary policy and foreign exchange provided the NBK with the full powers and functions of a central bank. The young banking system was severely tested during the Russia Crisis and the related transition to the free-floating Tenge regime (which was accompanied by abrupt devaluation of the national currency). Despite these challenges, the system showed significant stability, public confidence was not lost and the deposit base remained stable. The two main reasons for this were: the high levels of bank capitalization which had already been achieved; and the bold decision by the NBK to avert a run on deposits by publicly committing to convert Tenge deposits into Dollars at the pre-devaluation exchange rate of 88.3 KZT/$. All NBK obligations were fulfilled in an orderly and timely manner, which produced a sea change in depositor confidence. A meltdown of the banking sector, as seen in Russia, was not experienced. Within 1999 total deposits increased by 58 % in nominal terms, whilst private deposits grew by 36%. At the beginning of 2000, the Kazakhstan Deposit Guarantee Fund was established, with 16 leading banks taking part at the outset (representing 88% of all term deposits in the country). The Deposit Guarantee Fund was established as a Joint Stock Company with the ultimate aim of further boosting deposit inflow. With the same purpose, the “Law on Banking Secrecy in the Republic of Kazakhstan” was adopted in March 2000. Continued strict and responsible regulation by the NBK has led public confidence to new heights. In 2000, private deposits, including those from non-residents, increased by 66.8% and reached KZT 91.7bn (about $635mn.) The role of the 2nd tier banks in providing credit for the real economy has also substantially strengthened. Against a background of resumed economic growth, stable development of the financial sector, and the rapid growth of bank resources, the supply of credit to the real sector significantly expanded, further fuelling growth. By the end of 2000 the ratio of bank credit to GDP reached 11% (versus less than 8% in 1999). Nowadays more than 60% of bank resources are directed towards the real economy. In 2000, total bank assets reached KZT 527.9bn ($3.7bn), up from KZT 140.9bn ($1.9bn) in 1996. The share of non-performing loans has decreased to 2.0%, (24.3% in 1996). There are now 16 banks which are more than 50% foreign owned and their share of total banking sector capital is now 23.2%. Non-bank financial services are also developing. In 2000, regulations were introduced in relation to financial leasing, and many leading banks have established their own leasing companies. In addition, the Government has launched its “Long-Term Programme for Financing Residential Construction and Development of Mortgaging” to promote the mortgage finance sector. Among the measures for further strengthening banking sectors, the NBK has announced the following measures:
In general, at present the Kazakhstan banking sector is widely considered the most advanced and stable in the CIS. It demonstrates not only a quantitative increase in banking activities, but also improved quality of services. Its adherence to international standards for banking and General Principles of Bank Supervision (Basle Committee for Bank Supervision) allows it to support a high level of stability, and a rapid pace of development. Table 13. Main Economic and Banking Indicators (NBK), 1995-2000
Compared to the end of 2000, the share of the 3 leading banks, TuranAlem Bank, Kazkommertzbank, and Halyk Savings Bank, has grown from 35.5% to 47.9%. The share of foreign subsidiary banks has grown from 22.8% to 23.7 %. Indicators of capital adequacy remain strong:
The current trend within the sector is towards a somewhat lower capitalization rate, explained by faster growth of assets outpacing growth in equity capital. From the beginning of 2001, total assets have increased by KZT 155.1bn (29.4%) and reached KZT 683bn in September. The Dollar equivalent of total assets has reached $4,642mn, an increase of 27.1%, or $989mn.
Pension
System The total amount of funds accumulated by the pension system has reached KZT 161bn (66% up from KZT 97bn at the same date last year). A wide-scale state-sponsored advertising campaign is being run to increase public understanding and acceptance of the new pension system. However, private pension funds are reluctant to actively solicit business in rural areas, and even in smaller district centres. As a result almost half of the working age population remains outside the pension system. Official declarations, implying that pension reform (including the introduction of the “accumulating” (private) pension system instead of the “solidarity” (state) one) is close to being finalised, stand in marked contrast to the fact that the pension system nationwide covers only 4.3mn employees, compared with 8.6mn people of working age. The pension system is dominated by the State Accumulating Pension Fund (SAPF), which was initially meant to serve as a default option for depositors, to ease their entry into the new pension system while they make their choice between many private funds. In reality, as of 1998, the SAPF accumulated 95% of all pension deposits, almost all of which were invested in low-income T-bills, starving the real economy of much needed capital. Effectively, in 1998-1999 the new pension system was continuing to play the same budget-plugging role as the old system, funding the government at low interest rates. The last two years have seen a stark re-distribution of pension assets in favour of private funds – SAPF`s share has declined to 39% in 2000 and 33% in 2001 (as has, coincidentally, the government’s funding requirement). In the near future, SAPF is scheduled to be equalized with private funds and probably privatised. However, there has not been much tangible improvement with regard to pension fund investment assets – more than 70% of funds are invested in Kazakhstan government eurobonds and T-bills. Only 16 % are invested in the bonds and shares of companies which have class a “A” listing on the Kazakhstan Stock Exchange (KSE). Reflecting underdevelopment of the national capital markets, and concern with low investment returns, the Government has allowed the pension funds to invest in shares and bonds abroad. To date, the anticipated development of capital markets resulting from pension system reform has not occurred. Some 70% of private sector managed pension assets remain invested in Kazakhstan government debt. The overwhelming bulk of investments, around 90%, are invested in Dollar assets, creating the potential for losses from the foreign exchange mismatch and also the real appreciation of the Tenge. It is anticipated that the regulations governing investments overseas will soon be changed to allow for investment in a broader category of corporate and sovereign debt (Single ‘A’ as opposed to Double ‘A’ at present). More importantly, the new qualification for sovereign debt is rumoured to be lowered to a rating equivalent to that of Kazakhstan (now BB+), which will open significant new investment opportunities. A greater problem, however, has been the lack of mobilization of resources for domestic corporations. Although, unusually, the capital markets in Kazakhstan rank ahead of the banking sector for provision of finance to the real sector, this has been concentrated almost entirely in the blue chip sector of predominantly state owned or controlled companies. The realization of the potential of investment from the pension sector will depend upon improvements in corporate governance and accounting transparency.
Conclusion
While investor experience has undoubtedly improved since the tumultuous early years, lessons learnt in some sectors indicates caution is necessary. GML is well established in Kazakhstan and therefore favourably positioned to assist clients in identifying value in Kazakhstan and selecting suitable investments. Furthermore, the returns now available from Kazakh sovereign instruments have been eroded by the significant investment form the pension sector. In consequence, GML focuses on value-added transactions providing pick-up versus mainstream sovereign and state-sector debt which can be achieved through the trade finance and à forfait markets. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [1] Now 53.4% [2] Organization for Security and Co-operation In Europe [3] Source IMF [4] 78% of exports were accounted for by oil and other commodity products [5] i.e. the ratio of the index of export prices to the index of import prices [6] At the Peoples Assembly of Kazakhstan last session, 24 October 2001, he said “If we lower the pension age, then in 5-7 years there will be one pensioner for each working person. To cover these colossal expenditures KZT 30-50bn will be needed. There is no such money in the budget. We will come again to pension crisis. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
All
material on this website is Copyright © GML International Limited 2006
unless otherwise noted.
GML International Limited is authorised and regulated by the UK Financial Services
Authority.
Site
Map